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I 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this Appeal are Clayton and Nita Kearl 
(hereinafter, "the Kearls") and Micah J. Martin and Rachelle J. Martin 
(hereinafter, "the Martins"), the persons substituted in the action 
for the Plaintiff Western Mortgage Company (hereinafter, "Western"). 
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V 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, WHEN IT GRANTED WESTERN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WERE NOT ANY 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT WHICH PRECLUDED ENTRY OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF WESTERN. 
The trial court erred in concluding that there were no genuine 
issues of material fact present in this case which precluded it from 
granting Western's Motion for Summary Judgment. A genuine issue of 
fact exists in this case as to what property Western was seeking to 
claim by adverse possession in this proceeding. In its Complaint, 
Western asserts that it seeks to quiet title to property located on 
the west side of the property previously owned by the Kearls. 
However, the property description contained in Western's Complaint is 
not on the west side of the property previously owned by the Kearls. 
Furthermore, the property described in Western's Complaint is 
different from the property described in Western's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
The Martins assert in their Brief that the improper description 
of the property is irrelevant because it is "a typographical error." 
Typographical errors may not affect certain types of documents. 
However, titles to real property and descriptions of real property are 
dramatically and substantially affected by errors in the description 
4 
of the property. 
The Martins falsely assert in their Brief that the Kearls never 
objected to the adequacy of the description to "the 25-foot strip" of 
property that is the subject of this litigation and therefore, failed 
to preserve the issue of the adequacy and accuracy of the description 
of "the 25-foot strip" for this appeal. Those assertions are knowing, 
deliberate and willful misstatements of fact. The Kearls disputed the 
description of the property from their Answer throughout the entire 
time the case was before the trial court. The Kearls disputed the 
location of "the 25-foot strip" in their Answer, and they disputed the 
location of "the 25-foot strip" in their Memorandum in Opposition to 
Western's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at pp. 35, 83) 
Again, contrary to the assertions of the Martins, the Kearls 
never stipulated that "the 25-foot Strip" was on the west side of New 
Hope Drive. The trial court may have mistakenly assumed that the 
Kearls were stipulating to the location of "the 25-foot Strip", but 
the Kearls simply conceded at the scheduling conference that Western 
was asserting that "the 25-foot Strip" was on the west side of New 
Hope Drive. The Kearls still maintained that "the 25-foot Strip" 
described in Western's Complaint was not on the west side of the New 
Hope Drive property. When the Kearls learned, for the first time, 
from the trial court's minute entry, that the trial court had 
misconstrued the discussion at the scheduling conference, the Kearls 
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objected to the proposed order granting summary judgment. (Record at 
P. 186) 
Contrary to the Martins' assertions, the Kearls did properly 
dispute the description of "the 25-foot Strip" and did timely and 
properly dispute the adequacy of the legal description of "the 25-foot 
Strip". (Record at pp. 35, 83) Therefore, the Kearls properly 
preserved the issue of the location of "the 25-foot Strip" for appeal. 
The Martins' assertions that notice pleading rectifies the 
improper description of "the 25-foot Strip" in Western's Complaint is 
nonsense. The simple fact that Western describes "the 25-foot Strip" 
two different ways creates an issue of fact as to the location of "the 
25-foot Strip." The discrepancy in the description of "the 25-foot 
Strip" creates a genuine issue of fact as to what piece of property 
Western was attempting to quiet title to. Western is not permitted to 
describe two different pieces of property and then choose which 
description it likes best. Western created the erroneous 
descriptions, and the Kearls are not required to read Western's mind. 
Therefore, Western and/or the Martins cannot take advantage of the 
confusion Western created by its erroneous descriptions. 
Because there is discrepancy between the property described in 
Western's Complaint and the property described in Western's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, it was prejudicial and reversible error for the 
trial court to grant Western's Motion for Summary Judgment. Summary 
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the case and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. See, Billings v, Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803 
(Utah 1991). Because the trial court committed prejudicial and 
reversible error, this Court must reverse the trial courtfs grant of 
Summary Judgment. 
POINT n 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT 
WESTERN WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Western properly described the 
property it was claiming by adverse possession and that the trial 
court correctly ruled that there was no genuine issue of fact as to 
the location of "the 25-foot Strip11 of land Western sought to acquire 
to by adverse possession, Western was not entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law. 
As set forth in the Kearls initial Brief in this matter, in order 
for Western to prevail on its claim for adverse possession of the 
Kearls1 property, Western must demonstrate that: 1) it has been in 
continuous possession of the subject property for seven years; 2) it 
possessed the property openly, notoriously and hostilely; and, 3) it 
paid all of the taxes on the property during the time of possession. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, § 78-12-12. The Martins agree 
that in order for a party to claim property by adverse possession the 
party claiming title by adverse possession must satisfy all of the 
foregoing requirements. (Martin's Brief page 16). Because Western 
did not and cannot prove that it satisfied those requirements, Western 
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was not entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law, and the trial 
court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted 
Western's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
As set forth in the Kearls1 initial Brief, it is also an 
undisputed fact that, under Utah law, a person or entity whose 
possession is being tacked upon must have complied with all of the 
requirements of adverse possession during the time of their 
possession, in order for the person or entity tacking upon that 
possession to claim the prior possession as a part of possession time 
for ownership by adverse possession. See Home Owner's Loan 
Corporation v. Dudley, 141 P.2d 160, 166 (Utah 1943), declaring: 
The statutes for adverse possession require that possession be for a continuous period 
of seven years, during which period the claimant in possession must have paid all 
taxes levied and assessed upon the land according to law. (Emphasis added) 
"One who seeks to acquire title to real property other than by 
conveyance must comply precisely with the statutory requirements for 
doing so." United Park City Mines Co. v. Estate of Clecrcr, 737 P.2d 
173, 176 (Utah 1987). The failure of a person claiming to hold 
property by adverse possession to pay the taxes assessed for a 
substantial period of time is strong evidence that the possessor did 
not in reality claim title to the property. Id. 
The Martins did not, and cannot, dispute the fact that Johnson 
never paid any taxes on any of the New Hope Drive property during the 
time Johnson was in possession of the property. Yet, the Martins 
assert that Western could pay the taxes on the property for Johnson 
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some ten years after he allegedly began his adverse possession of the 
property and that the payment by Western, some ten years after Johnson 
allegedly began his adverse possession of the property fulfills 
Johnson's obligation for payment of taxes under Utah law for adverse 
possession. That assertion is directly controverted by Utah case law. 
In Bowen v. Olsen, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P.2d 983, 985 (1954), the 
Utah Supreme Court specifically held that a party claiming to acquire 
title to property by adverse possession cannot wait any number of 
years and then pay the taxes in a lump sum, as Western did in this 
case. The Bowen Court declared that one of the purposes of the 
statute requiring payment of taxes in order to establish adverse 
possession is that by paying taxes on the land a public record is made 
which gives notice to the owner that his land is being claimed 
adversely. Id. at 985. 
The facts of Bowen are very similar to the facts of this case. 
In the instant matter, Western waited ten years and then paid the 
taxes on the property in a lump some, after Johnson, upon whose 
possession Western seeks to tack, had paid no taxes. 
The Martins cite the Court to Burbadae v. Rosen. 400 S. W. 2d 
502, 504 (1966) for the proposition that each possessor need not pay 
property taxes during his possession of property claimed by adverse 
possession, so long as one of the claimants pays all of the assessed 
taxes. However, Burbadae, is not a Utah case and it cannot over-rule 
or contradict the express language and holding of Bowen, supra. 
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Therefore, the Martins reliance on Burbadae is misplaced, and Burbadae 
is of no precedential value in this case. 
Because Johnson never paid any taxes on any of the New Hope Drive 
property, Johnson is not legally entitled to claim any of the property 
by adverse possession, and certainly not the Kearls1 property. Bowen, 
supra, Home Owner's Loan Corporation v. Dudley, supra, and United Park 
City Mines Co. v. Estate of Cleqq, supra. Because Johnson is not 
legally entitled to claim any of the New Hope Drive property by 
adverse possession, Western cannot tack onto Johnson's alleged adverse 
possession of any of the New Hope Drive property for its alleged 
adverse possession of the Kearls' property. 
Western has only been in possession of the New Hope Drive 
property since March 1994. Because Western is not legally entitled to 
tack onto Johnson's alleged adverse possession of the Kearls' property 
for its alleged adverse possession of the Kearls' property, under Utah 
law, Western cannot satisfy the requirements for adverse possession of 
any of the New Hope Drive property. Therefore, the trial court 
committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted Western's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Because the trial court committed 
prejudicial and reversible error, this Court must reverse the trial 
court's grant of Summary Judgment in favor of Western and direct the 
trial court to enter judgment in favor of the Kearls. 
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POINT III 
CLAYTON KEARL'S AFFIDAVIT IS NOT BASED ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE. 
Contrary to the Martins' assertion to this Court and Western's 
assertion to the trial court, Defendant Clayton Kearl's Affidavit is 
not based on inadmissible evidence. The Martins improperly assert 
that Mr. Kearl's Affidavit filed with the trial court is based on 
inadmissible evidence, because Mr. Kearl refers to documents on file 
at the County Recorder's Office in his Affidavit. The Martins assert 
that paragraphs Nos. 2 and 3 of Mr. Kearl's Affidavit are improper 
because they make reference to those documents on file with the County 
Recorder. 
The documents referred to in paragraphs Nos. 1 and 3 of Mr. 
Kearl's Affidavit are not inadmissible hearsay. Rule 803(8) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence specifies that public records such as those 
filed in the County Recorder's Office are not hearsay. Therefore, Mr. 
Kearl's Affidavit is not based on inadmissible hearsay. Because, Mr. 
Kearl's Affidavit was proper, the trial court was correct in not 
striking it, and Mr. Kearl's Affidavit raised genuine and material 
issues of fact which precluded the trial court from entering summary 
judgment in favor of Western. 
Because the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible 
error when it granted Western's Motion for Summary Judgment, this 
Court must reverse the trial court's grant of Summary Judgment in 
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favor of Western and direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor 
of the Kearls. 
VI 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court committed reversible and prejudicial error when 
it granted Western's Motion for Summary Judgement. Therefore, the 
trial court's grant of Summary Judgment must be reversed and the trial 
court directed to enter judgment in favor of the Kearls. 
WHEREFORE, the Kearls respectfully request that the summary 
judgment entered by the trial court be reversed and the trial court be 
instructed to enter judgment in favor of the Kearls. 
Respectfully submitted this /IZ/^day of November 1995. A^dav 
Chartes^A. Schultz 
Attorney for Clayton and Nita Kearl 
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